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3Abstract
In this paper we estimate nitrogen fertilizer demand elasticities for Danish crop farms using the dual
profit function approach on micro panel data. The model includes several farm specific parameters
allowing us to estimate the mean demand elasticity and test for homogeneity of elasticities across
panel farms. We find a mean own price elasticity for nitrogen of
 -0.45 and a significant standard deviation from this mean for individual farms of 0.24.
Heterogeneity of demand elasticities implies that regulating fertilizer application through
mandated uniform percent reductions, as is currently used in Danish nitrogen regulation, increases
abatement costs when compared to tax regulation. Somewhat surprisingly, this only causes the
abatement costs of quota regulation to be 8% larger than with tax regulation. Simulation results
indicate that the primary threat to the efficiency of uniform reduction schemes comes from inaccurate
estimation of baselines rather than from heterogeneity of elasticities.
41. Introduction
Nitrate leaching is considered to be a serious environmental problem in Denmark, and
agricultural application of nitrogen fertilizer has been regulated for a number of years. As in a number
of other countries, Danish regulation of fertilizer application is essentially based on standards and
norms.
Under the present regulations, crop farms are required to reduce nitrogen fertilizer
application to 90% of the profit maximizing level, with each farm’s baseline being calculated so as to
take account of land quality, land allocation to each crop and crop rotation etc. on the individual
farm. Noncompliant farmers are fined with a fee calculated as a progressive function of the
magnitude of noncompliance. Depending on political priorities, if the reduction in farm profits and
land values caused by such a system are substantially smaller than for tax regulation, (as is confirmed
in this study), quotas may be viewed as having a distributional advantage over taxes. On the other
hand, proportional reduction quotas are less efficient than e.g. a fertilizer tax, if fertilizer price
elasticities vary across farms and/or baselines are inaccurately estimated. Furthermore, the quota
system requires monitoring of detailed farm level data for calculation of baselines and for deterring
illicit inter-farm fertilizer trading.
In this paper we quantify the abatement costs and distributional effects of reducing nitrogen
fertilizer application on Danish crop farms through proportional reduction quotas, grand fathered
tradable quotas and a fertilizer tax. This is done by estimating nitrogen fertilizer demand for Danish
crop farms using the dual profit function approach on micro panel data. The model includes several
farm specific parameters so that heterogeneity of elasticities among panel farms is allowed and can
be tested against a hypothesis of homogeneous elasticities. We reject the homogeneous elasticity
hypothesis and find a sizable variation in farm elasticities (with a standard deviation for individual
farm elasticities of over 50% of the panel mean). Somewhat surprisingly, this only causes the
abatement costs of quota regulation to be 8% larger than with tax regulation. Simulation results
indicate that the primary threat to the efficiency of uniform reduction schemes comes from inaccurate
estimation of baselines rather than from heterogeneity of elasticities.
Since regulation of agricultural nitrogen fertilizer application is also undertaken in a number
of other countries, these findings may be of more general interest.
Our analysis may also be of methodological interest since we exploit the possibilities of our
panel data by specifying a variant of the trans-log profit function that allows heterogeneity of
elasticities and makes testing against a hypothesis of homogeneous elasticities possible. Although a
number of recent papers have estimated the fertilizer demand of industrialised farmers, (e.g. Burrell
(1989) - including a good review of older studies, Denbaly and Vroomen (1993), Rayner and
Cooper (1994), Garcia and Randall (1994), Mergos and Stoforos (1997)), heterogeneity of
elasticities and its regulatory implications has received little attention.
In section 2 we present the economic model and functional specification to be estimated.
The data are described in section 3, and model estimation is presented in section 4. Section 5
summarises the results, and conclusions are drawn in section 6.      
2. The Model
In the following we assume that crop farm production is described by a well-behaved 
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production function f(x,n,z) where x is an aggregate crop output (positively signed), n is nitrogen
fertilizer input (negatively signed) and z is input of cultivated land which is considered  fixed for the
scope and time horizon of the analysis. The production of the intermediate fixed cultivated land input
is specified as follows:
 
z = z(capital, labour, materials, uncultivated land)
so that the specified primary inputs can be dropped from the model since the intermediate input is
observed in the data. 
We assume that cultivated land is produced using land, tractor and harvesting equipment,
and fuel and labour as inputs (i.e. the cost of cultivating a hectare of land is assumed to be independ-
ent of the amount of fertilizer applied and the crop yield harvested). The remaining non-nutrient
cropping input (drying costs, sowing seed and pesticide costs) is assumed to be proportional to crop
production (i.e. a limitation production relationship). Proportionality to crop output is also assumed
for phosphorous and potash fertilizer since, under Danish farming conditions they are usually applied
to insure an ample stock of these nutrients for growing crops (i.e. the nutrient restricting crop
production is normally nitrogen). Thus, only nitrogen fertilizer input and land enter into a complex
production relationship with crop output.
While retaining flexible estimation of behaviour with respect to key nitrogen flows, this
simple specification makes it possible to estimate farm specific fertilizer demand elasticities and test
for homogeneity.
We denote the dual profit function B(px,pn ,z,2) where px is a price index of aggregate crop
output, pn  is the price of nitrogen fertilizer and 2 is a vector of parameters. For farmer i, the
complete system of profit and derived demand and supply functions becomes:
The shadow values or rent of the fixed cultivated land inputs r, can be derived from the profit
function  as:
Regulatory efficiency
After estimating , the effect on farm i of introducing a nitrogen tax t can be simulated by inserting 2i
pin + t  into (1). We denote initial farm profit and nitrogen fertilizer application  B
I
i'B(p
x
i ,p
n
i ,zi,2i)
1 We use fertilizer application as an indicator of nitrogen loss/leaching in the following. This
is clearly not a reasonable effect indicator for livestock farms where manure application is important,
but for crop farms without manure application it may be acceptable. Furthermore, the aggregation
level of the model estimated here implies that the two measures, by definition, are proportional,
making distinction redundant for the following analysis.   
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costs (i.e. profit reduction less tax payment) and the change in nitrogen application on)c Ti )n
T
i
farm i that is induced by a fertilizer tax become:
Exploiting the profit/production function duality virtual price result of Neary and Roberts
(1980), the corresponding effect of a nitrogen quota Qi, can be simulated by inserting a farm specific
fertilizer tax qi, which exactly ensures that nitrogen demand equals the quota (i.e. that
) while refunding tax revenue. Remembering that fertilizer input and quotasQi'
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are negatively signed, farm profit under the quota becomes:
and the corresponding abatement cost and nitrogen application change on  farm i become:
For a regulator wishing to implement an aggregate reduction goal , it is well known that a)N
fertilizer tax will ensure the distribution of reductions among farmers that minimizes aggregate
abatement costs:
when   .1 j )n Ti ' j )n Qi ' )N
The current Danish fertilizer quota system aims to reduce fertilizer application to 90% of
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the profit maximizing level on crop farms (for farms with animal husbandry, the ambition is to
increase manure utilization as well). This is done by calculating a profit maximizing baseline for each
farm using self reported crop rotation and land allocation and mandating a fertilizer quota of 90% of
this baseline. Quotas are controlled by random checks of farm accounts etc. If the regulator is able
to generate exact estimates of each farm's baseline fertilizer application, and if fertilizer demand
elasticities are homogeneous across farms, then such a quota system will induce abatement costs
equal to those induced by a fertilizer tax (i.e.  ). If, on the other hand,t ' q1 '...' qi '....' qm
these assumptions do not apply, proportional reduction quotas will be less efficient and may imply
substantially higher abatement costs.  
Distributional effects
Distributional effects may be an important dimension of instrument choice in general, and
perhaps especially so when farmers are regulated. This is because regulation not only affects current
farm profits, but we would also expect future profit losses to be capitalised in land values so that in
addition current owners may suffer substantial capital losses.
Consider first the distributional effects of a fertilizer tax. The core effect is the  reduction of
annual farm profits  i.e:)BTi
Since land is an immobile factor of production, a reduction in farm profit will probably affect the
value of farmland. If farms are typically sold as one unit (a going concern), a simplistic indicator of
the effect on farm values is the capitalized value of the annual profit reduction  i.e.:  ªL Ti
where i is the interest rate.
At present, however, the Danish agricultural sector is undergoing substantial concentration
and farmers expanding land holdings have for some time been dominant on the demand side of the
land market. If existing farmers engaging in marginal adjustments of land holdings dominate the
market, a more relevant indicator of the effect on land values will be the effect on marginal land rent,
since this indicates the effect of regulation on what existing farmers are willing to pay for additional
land. We denote the initial rent of the marginal hectare of cultivated land  andr Ii '
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mobile factors of production, it seems reasonable to assume that the entire rent change accrues to
the immobile factor land. A simplistic indicator of the effect on land values in this case is the
capitalized value of the change in  marginal land rent  i.e.: )L Ti
8)BQi ' B
I
i & B
Q
i (12)
ªL Qi ' )B
Q
i /i (13)
r Qi '
dBQi
dzi
'
*BQi
*zi
%
*BQi
*pn
*q i
*zi
&
*q i
*zi
Qi & qi
*Qi
*zi
(14)
r Qi '
*BQi
*zi
& qi
*Qi
*zi
(15)
)L Qi ' (r
I
i & r
Q
i )zi/i (16)
Though both indicators are crude, the land value effects they span may indicate the magnitude of the
land value effects of regulation.
Now we consider the distributional effects of a quota. The core profit effect and capitalized
value hereof are:
and
Marginal land rent under a quota is the marginal effect on profit (defined in (5)) of increasing
cultivated land input i.e.:
By inserting the definition  the equation is reduced to:Qi'
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(p xi ,p
n
i %q i,zi,2i)
 
Thus the capitalized value of this effect becomes :
 
3. The Data   
Estimations are based on a panel data set provided by Landbrugets Rådgivningscenter (The Danish
Agricultural Advisory Centre). The panel contains annual data, and is unbalanced covering ten
growing seasons (1982 to 1991) with, on average, 1350 farms represented each year with each
farm participating 3.9 years on average.  Data are sampled from detailed gross margin accounts
through a voluntary programme where only a small part of the more business oriented farmers
participate. On the one hand, voluntary participation is an advantage in that participating farmers a
priori are motivated and have an incentive to provide data of high quality. On the other hand, the
sample of farmers in the data set is not representative of the population of Danish farmers.
For this analysis a group of specialised crop farms were selected. The criteria for selecting
was that the farmer had no animal husbandry (cattle, pigs, chickens etc.) Specialised crop farms
comprise about 15% of all farms in the data set. In the estimation we further restrict the sample to
farms that have participated in the panel for more than three seasons.
9     For each farm the data include detailed annual accounts of variable costs along with
corresponding accounts of quantitative flows of most nitrogen relevant inputs and outputs (i.e. 
fertilizer and crop yield). This allows an analysis of production and calculation of output and input
prices at the farm level. Coefficients indicating average nitrogen content of crop outputs have been
added enabling us to calculate annual farm level mass balances for nitrogen and residual nitrogen loss
(see Hansen and Jensen (1998) for details). Mean values of the price index for each are reported in
table 1.   
Table 1 Means of farm specific price indexes for specialized crop farms
Year            Crops        N-fertilizer
1982 1.10 0.88
1983 1.22 1.12
1984 1.37 1.14
1985 1.17 1.26
1986 1.17 1.12
1987 1.10 0.83
1988 1.07 0.80
1989 1.10 0.89
1990 0.97 0.93
1991 0.93 1.07
Prices of nitrogen input were calculated directly for each farmer as cost divided by volume. Using a
common base observation (containing all crop types), Fisher price indexes for crops were con-
structed based on the individual farmer's price. These were calculated as income (net of proportional
input costs i.e. costs of drying, sowing seed, pesticides and phosphorous and potash fertilizer)
divided by volume. Thus prices for nitrogen input and crop output vary across farms as well as over
time. Both indexes exhibit substantial variation over the data period though no trend is apparent.
Mean values for key production variables and environmental indicators are shown in table
2. As noted above applied nitrogen fertilizer volume is registered in farm accounts while nitrogen loss
is calculated using registered volumes and standard (average) nitrogen coefficients (again see Hansen
and Jensen 1998 for details). Profit shares are defined as shares of gross profits before deduction of
fixed costs and costs of cultivation. Thus this profit concept equals income from crop sales net of
proportional input costs minus the cost of nitrogen fertilizer, so that the sum of the two profit shares
(the input share being negatively signed) by definition equals one for each observation.   
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Table 2. Means of production and emission variables for specialized crop farms
Profit share - Crops  1.034
Profit share - N-fertil-
izer 
-0.034
Cultivated area   188.9 hectares
Applied nitrogen fertil-
izer
  136.2 kg/hectare 
Nitrogen loss    62.6 kg/hectare 
Number of farms 194
Number of observations  967 
The participating crop farms are substantially larger than is typical for Danish crop farms, while
fertilizer application and nitrogen loss per hectare correspond to that of typical Danish crop farms
(see e.g. Brouwer et al. (1995) for nitrogen balances and a useful cross country comparison).  
4. Estimation 
The profit function in (1) is assumed to have the trans-log functional form with the following
estimable specification:
yielding derived profit share equations of the following form: 
where i is a farm index, t indicates the time period and  and  are thes xi,t '
p xi,t xi,t
Bi,t
s ni,t '
p ni,t ni,t
Bi,t
profit shares of crop output and nitrogen fertilizer input. Note that ai, bix, and bin are farm specific
parameters allowing fixed effects in each budget share equation as well as in the profit equation.
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Furthermore cixx,x , cix,,n , cin,,n and cin,x are permitted to vary across farms in a structured way
(specified below) that allows for homogeneity as well as varying degrees of 
heterogeneous price elasticities across farms. 
The complete system is estimated in two steps. First, the system of derived profit share
equations (without the profit function) is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. Restricting
the parameters to ensure symmetry and homogeneity in prices (but not in the fixed land input (i.e.  
 , and   for all i ) we eliminate the cropb xi % b
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equation ( ) to avoid singularity (the maximum likelihood procedure ensures that estimates ares xi,t
invariant as to which equation is eliminated). Technically, the c parameters in (19) are estimated
using within farm transformed variables, eliminating time invariant farm specific constant bin  and the
homogeneity/symmetry restrictions, i.e.:
where indicates within transformed variables. The fixed effects  bin are then estimated as.˜
 for each i with   indicating the mean value ofbˆ ni ' s¯i,t & cˆ
n,n
i ( ln¯(p
n
i,t) & ln¯(p
x
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the variable taken over the time periods that farm i participates in the panel.
The degrees of freedom allowed by the data makes estimation of unrestricted farm specific 
 coefficients infeasible. Instead we generalize the standard trans-log model by lettingc n,ni c
n,n
i
depend on farm specific mean input prices using the following quadratic specification: 
The quadratic functional form is a flexible generalisation of the usual uniform coefficient assumption,
which is attractive for our purposes since, when inserted into the trans-log own price elasticity
formula  the mean price elasticity becomes:e ni ' s¯
n
i %
c n,ni
s¯ ni
& 1
This is nice because, if "1 =  0 and "3 = -1 then ein  becomes constant (homogeneous) across farms
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which makes it possible to test the hypotheses of elasticity homogeneity. We can also test for
applicability of the usual simple trans-log specification (i.e. restrictions "2 =  0 and "3 = 0). 
After inserting (21) into (20) and regrouping we have the following equation to be
estimated:
  
where square parentheses indicate the independent variables used in estimation and ui,t is an  error
term. The error term is assumed to be normally distributed and equation (23) was estimated with
SAS PROC MODEL using full information maximum likelihood. Results of this estimation are
reported in table 3 (parameters for the crop equation were calculated residually).
Table 3 Common parameters estimated in the first step
     Estimated general model                 Test of restrictions
                 (likelihood ratio)
Para-
meter
Estimate Approx
Std Err
Approx
Prob 
Homogeneous 
Elasticities
Standard 
Trans-Log
"1
"2
"3
cn,z
-0.0051
 0.5714
 5.0789
 0.0072
0.0085
0.3062
2.2783
0.0052
0.5299
0.0624
0.0260
0.1705
0
-1
0
0
  DF    Model sig.     R2      
 769   P2(4)=34.30  0.0348  
(0.0000) 
P2(2)=17.81
(0.0001) 
P2(2)= 4.96
(0.0837) 
Table 4 contains the mean, median and standard deviation of the distribution of residually calculated
farm specific fixed effects.
Table 4 Farm specific fixed effects estimated in the first step
Para-
meter
mean of
estimates
median of
estimates
std. dev.
of
estimates  
bin
bix*
-0.0733
 1.0733
-0.0709
 1.0709
0.0195
0.0195
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In the second step the remaining parameters of the profit function were estimated treating
fixed effects and parameters estimated in the derived system as known, i.e. :
If the parameters estimated in the first step are unbiased, this will also be the case for parameters
estimated in the second step. However, the procedure may generate heteroscedasticity and
invalidate the usual inference statistics. Results of the second step (also estimated with SAS PROC
MODEL using full information maximum likelihood) are presented in table 5.    
Table 5 Parameters estimated in the second step  
Param-
eter
Estimate Approx
Std Err*
Approx
Prob* 
bz
cz,z
  1.1028    0.0756    0.0001 
  1.0471    0.3119    0.0008 
mean of
Estimates
median of
Estimates
std. dev.
of
Estimates
ai  -4.9924   -4.6416    4.2655 
  DF    Model sig.     R2       
771   P2(2)=137.52  0.1326  
(0.0000)   
Note: * inference statistics are conditional on known first step parameters, i.e. a lower bound for
true standard errors. 
    
The first step estimation is highly significant though most individual parameters are not. Estimated
share equations are consistent with monotonicity and convexity. Inspection of error correlation
matrices did not reveal serious serial correlation. Statistical tests showed that the error distribution is
significantly different from the normal distribution though residual plots indicated that deviation is not
substantial.  Residual plots showed clear signs of heteroscedastic error terms. Though non-normality
and heteroscedasticity may invalidate inference tests, parameter estimates are still unbiased. The
second step estimation is also highly significant and error correlation matrices and residual plots did
2  Note that the reported measures are almost identical to the corresponding measures 
after price deflation to the mean panel price level (see appendix). Deflation gives consistent estimates
of aggregate behaviour, however, deflation may widen confidence intervals around the calculated
individual farm elasticities. In our case the discussion turns out to be academic since the resulting
elasticities are almost identical.
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not indicate serious serial correlation or heteroscedasticity, but significant non-normality was
detected.
Estimated price elasticities (see appendix) have the expected signs in over 95% of all single
observations. All single observations of rents of cultivated land have the expected sign. In conclusion
the estimated model performs well statistically and generates plausible behavioural inferences.
Accepting the general model the restriction tests reported in table 3 can be interpreted.
Though qualified by non-normality and heteroscedasticity the clear rejection of the homogeneity
hypothesis indicates that nitrogen demand elasticities are heterogeneous across panel farms. This is
confirmed by the bootstrap confidence interval around the calculated standard deviation of farm
elasticities from the panel mean that is reported below. The restriction resulting in the simple
standard trans-log specification can, on the other hand, only be rejected at the 10% level. In
conclusion elasticities are heterogeneous across the panel, but the general model specification only
results in a slightly better description of this heterogeneity than the standard trans-log specification. In
the following section we base results on the general model specification.
5. Results
In table 6 we report mean elasticities and standard deviations of individual farm elasticities from
these means (as a measure of the heterogeneity of elasticities in the sample) using the parameters
reported in the previous section. Mean and standard deviations of farm elasticities  are calculated
using one observation for each farm evaluated at mean farm prices.2
Table 6 Own price elasticity of nitrogen fertilizer 
         Point estimate      90% confidence inter-
val*    
Mean of panel farm elastici-
ties   
-0.45           [-0.58 : -0.31]
    
Standard deviation of farm
elasticities from panel mean
 0.24           [ 0.01 :  0.41]
  
Note: One elasticity observation per farm evaluated at mean farm prices.
* Calculated by bootstrapping based on 1250 data re-samplings.
The mean own price elasticity for nitrogen fertilizer of -0.45 reported here has a short run Marsh-
alian interpretation. Given this, it is in line with or somewhat larger numerically than the elasticities
found in several recent studies (all based on aggregate time series covering all or most of the
3 When consistently estimated results for both composite fertilizer and nitrogen are
reported (see Burrel, 1989 and some of the older studies summarised in Burrel’s paper) the nitrogen
elasticity tends to be the same size or numerically larger. Thus the Hicksian short run composite
elasticity reported by Kristensen and Jensen (1999) indicates a short run Marshalian nitrogen
elasticity numerically larger than -0.52 while the composite Marshalian long run elasticity reported by
Jensen (1996) probably implies a comparable elasticity substantially larger than the one found here.
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agricultural sector), e.g. Burrel (1989) finds a short run elasticity of between -0.4 and -0.6, and
Rayner and Cooper (1994) find an elasticity of between -0.1 (short run) and 
-0.25 (long run), for the UK, while Denbaly and Vroomen (1993) report between -0.2 (short run)
and -0.4 (long run) for the USA, all with Marshalian interpretations as ours. 
Three studies of fertilizer demand by Danish agriculture are of special interest. In an older
study using aggregate time series covering the entire Danish agricultural sector, Dubgaard (1987)
estimates a Marshalian nitrogen fertilizer own price elasticity of -0.19.  Jensen (1996), using an
estimated aggregate model of Danish agriculture, finds a Marshalian long run elasticity for composite
NPK-fertilizer  of -1.8 and Kristensen and Jensen (1999), using cost functions estimated on panel
data, find a short run Hicksian elasticity for composite NPK-fertilizer  of -0.52 for Danish crop
farms. Our finding is somewhat larger numerically than Dubgaard's result but smaller than the
comparable elasticities implied by the two more recent studies.3
The main contribution of this paper is the quantification of the heterogeneity of elasticities
across farms. As a measure of this, the standard deviation of individual farm elasticities from the
mean of panel elasticities is found to be 0.24 as indicated in table 6. The bootstrap confidence
interval indicates that this is significantly different from zero at the 5% level, supporting the clear
rejection of the homogeneous elasticity hypotheses in the previous section. Thus, the standard
deviation is significant and sizable: with 50% of the panel farms having elasticities outside the -0.33
to -0.57 range around the mean elasticity.
If all farms had had the same fertilizer demand elasticity quotas, requiring uniform percentage
reductions in fertilizer application would result in an optimal allocation of cutbacks  across farms. 
When elasticities are heterogeneous, however, uniform percentage reductions become inefficient,
inducing aggregate abatement costs that are larger than the minimum level that would be ensured by
tax regulation. This is the classical efficiency argument for preferring economic incentive regulation to
standards and norms. 
In practical applications, a regulator using uniform percentage reduction quotas also faces
the problem of estimating fertilizer application baselines for each farm. This is not a trivial task since
baseline applications depend on a number of farm specific factors which are not observed perfectly
by the regulator (farm land quality, local weather conditions, capacity and quality of fixed capital
inputs, entrepreneurial talent etc.). Thus baselines will generally be estimated with some degree of
error, implying that the applied individual farm quotas will deviate in some random way from the
uniform percentage reduction goal. In addition, if the farm specific information used for calculating
baselines depends on farm production decisions,  incentives that distort these decisions may be
generated.
Using our model of panel farms we are able to quantify the abatement cost increase of
reduction quotas caused by elasticity heterogeneity and the additional abatement cost increase that
would result from various magnitudes of random errors in baseline measurement. Because of the
4 Specifically farm quotas Qi are set to a uniform percentage of each farm's estimated
baseline application (including measurement error). Then farm specific tax rates qi which implement
these are found by iteration for each farm after which abatement costs are calculated using equation
(6). The uniform percentage of baselines used to calculate farm specific quotas that ensure an
aggregate 10% application reduction are found by iteration in an outer loop. Without measurement
error, a uniform percentage of 90 ensures a 10% reduction. With a normally distributed measure-
ment error, some 90% quotas may exceed actual optimal farm  application so that the uniform
percentage must be increased in order to avoid exceeding the 10% reduction goal.
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aggregation level of the estimated model, the effect of distorting incentives  generated by the baseline
calculation system cannot be evaluated.
Results are presented in the first row of table 7 where abatement costs (DKK/kilo reduction
in nitrogen application) are indicated for a 10% reduction in applications. The fertilizer tax rate t is
found by iteration and abatement costs calculated using equation (3) parameterised with the
estimated model. For the quota system the baseline for each farm is calculated as the farm's optimal
unregulated fertilizer application plus a random error term drawn from a normal distribution with zero
mean and a standard deviation of the indicated percentage of the farm's optimal application level.
Thus the abatement cost difference between the tax and the quota with 0% measurement error can
be interpreted as the isolated cost effect of the estimated panel elasticity heterogeneity, whereas
differences to the remaining columns include the added cost effect of the indicated baseline
measurement error.4 In the final column the abatement cost of a corresponding tradable quota
system is presented. These are calculated under the assumption that the quota market is perfect (i.e.
resulting in a post trading allocation of quotas equal to the applications induced by a fertilizer tax), so
that abatement costs are independent of the initial quota distribution.    
By design, the fertilizer tax generates incentives that minimize abatement costs. We see that
the abatement cost increase under the non-tradable quota scheme induced by the sizable elasticity
heterogeneity estimated here is relatively small, amounting to a cost increase of less than 8%. This is
about the magnitude of the abatement cost increase caused by a 2.5% baseline measurement error,
whereas larger measurement errors cause substantially larger cost increases. Note that the table
does not include distorting effects or administrative costs of the non-tradable quota systems baseline
estimation procedure. If these are important, the efficiency advantage of using taxes will be greater
than indicated in the table. Likewise the table does not include added administrative costs or
incentive distortions of the tradable quota systems grand fathering procedure, which may cause such
a system to be less efficient than tax regulation. 
5 Since baseline measurement error only affects the initial distribution of quotas in the
tradable quota system, this does not affect the efficiency or aggregate farm income presented here.
However measurement error may cause substantial income redistribution among individual farmers.   
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Table 7 Abatement costs and agricultural income effects when aggregate N-fertilizer
application is reduced by 10% (DKK per kilo N-fertilizer reduction)
Tax  Non-tradable Quotas* 
proportional percent reduction in appli-
cation with baseline measurement error of
Grand-
fathered
Tradable 
quotas*
0 % 2½ % 5 % 7½ % 10 %
Average abatement
costs 
0.376 0.406 0.426 0.483 0.566 0.668 0.376
Average farm profit 7.377 0.406 0.426 0.483 0.566 0.668 0.376
Average farm capital
loss 
73.8 -
490.5
4.1 -
25.5
4.3 -
26.8
4.8 -
30.5
5.7 -
35.7
6.7 -
42.2
3.8 -
24.2
Note: Measurement errors are normally distributed with standard deviation of the indicated per cent of baseline.
Calculations are at 1989 fertilizer and crop prices. The fertilizer tax rate is 0.776 DKK/kilo N-fertilizer. The applied
quota percentages of baseline application are 90.0% for tradable quotas and non-tradable quotas with a 0% error,
90.2% for a 2½% error, 90.5% for a 5% error, 90.9% for a 7½% error, and 91.5% for a 10% error. The interest rate
used in the calculation of capital loss is 10%.
* Excluding the possibly distorting effect on farm production decisions of the baseline estimation proce-
dure/initial quota distribution procedure.      
In rows two and three the policy effect on annual farm profit and land values are presented (per kilo
fertilizer reduction for cross row comparability). The effect on annual profit is calculated using
equations (9) and (12) respectively. The lower bound on the land value effects is calculated using
equations (10) and (13), and equations (11) and (16) are used to find the upper bound (the trans-
log specification of (10),(11) and (13) is straight forward, see appendix for  specification of (16)).
Closely matching the revenue raised by a fertilizer tax, the reduction it causes in farm income
is between 11 and 18 times the income reduction caused by a quota system. The corresponding land
value reductions are between 11 and 19 times as large. The substantial differences in distributional
effects are not surprising given the inelasticity of nitrogen demand and the relatively small abatement
cost advantage of the fertilizer tax. The distributional effects of the tradable quota system are smaller
than for the non-tradable system, reflecting the efficiency advantage.5 Again table 7 assumes that the
baseline estimation procedure/quota distribution procedure has negligible distortionery effects.  
6. Conclusions  
Using farm level panel data and a generalized trans-log profit function specification with a number of
farm specific parameters we find a short run Marshalian price elasticity for nitrogen fertilizer demand
by Danish crop farms of -0.45. This is within the span of elasticities found internationally and in other
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Danish studies.
The main contribution of this paper is the quantification of the heterogeneity of elasticities
across farms. As a measure of this, the standard deviation of individual farm elasticities from the
mean of panel farm elasticities is found to be 0.24. This indicates sizable heterogeneity with 50% of
the panel farms having elasticities outside the -0.33 to -0.57 range around the mean elasticity.
The classical economic argument for incentive regulation is that heterogeneity of elasticities
causes abatement costs of uniform percentage reduction quotas to increase above the minimum level
ensured by tax regulation. However, the abatement cost increase induced by the (sizable) estimated
heterogeneity amounts to less than 8%  of the abatement cost minimum that is ensured if reductions
are induced by a fertilizer tax. This result is somewhat surprising, suggesting that the classical
argument for incentive regulation may be relatively weak even in regulatory situations with substantial
polluter heterogeneity. Our simulation results indicate that inaccurate estimation of baselines may be
a more important threat to the efficiency of uniform reduction schemes than heterogeneity of
elasticities. 
The substantial agricultural income and land value reductions associated with a fertilizer tax
can be avoided without efficiency loss through a system of grand fathered tradable quotas (assuming
that a non-distorting quota distribution procedure is utilized). If policymakers, for ethical or other
reasons, forbid trading, our results indicate that the efficiency loss due to heterogeneity is limited.
There may still, however, be a substantial efficiency loss due to baseline measurement error and to
distorting incentives generated by the baseline estimation procedure. At any rate, our results indicate
that careful designing of baseline estimation procedures should be given a high priority whenever
uniform percentage reduction schemes are used.
It is important to stress that the specific implications regarding the Danish nitrogen quota
system drawn here only cover its application to crop farms. Interpretation as an evaluation of the
system in general would be misleading since relative performance of different regulatory instruments
on farms with livestock may be very different. First of all, because behavioural relations for pig and
dairy farms may differ substantially and second, because the Danish quota system has special rules
for livestock farms reducing quotas by the calculated fertilizer value of manure.
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Appendix
Price elasticities derived from the general model 
Own and cross price elasticities and land rent are calculated for expected input/output profit shares
for each data observation and for each farm at mean farm prices both for non-deflated prices and
after deflating to the mean panel price level. The mean, median and standard deviation of the
distribution of individual observation and farm  elasticities/rents and the proportion of positive
elasticities/rents are reported for all input/output price combinations.     
Input/
output
           Individual observations
          non-deflated prices
         (967 observations) 
           Farm observations
     non-deflated mean farm pric-
es 
        (194 observations)  
x
Mean  
median 
Std Dev
%>0  
n
Mean  
median
Std Dev. 
%>0   
Prices 
     px     pn      
   0.019  -0.019   
   0.014  -0.014   
   0.023   0.023   
     95%     5%     
                      
   0.442  -0.442   
  0.469  -0.469  
            0.285   0.285         
                95%     5%        
                    
        Land rent    
                DKK/hectare       
    Mean        41285.21    
  Median      41040.62     
       Std Dev.    13154.98       
         %>0           100%       
  
Prices 
     px     pn      
   0.019  -0.019   
   0.014  -0.014   
   0.025   0.025   
     97%     3%     
                      
   0.447  -0.447   
  0.457  -0.457  
            0.238   0.238         
                 97%    3%        
                    
        Land rent   
       DKK/hectare
 Mean        38412.67    
  Median      38218.60     
       Std Dev.    11068.25       
         %>0           100%       
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Input/
output
           Individual observations
          deflated prices
         (967 observations) 
       Farm observations 
      deflated mean farm prices
         (194 observations)  
x
Mean  
median 
Std Dev
%>0  
n
Mean  
median
Std Dev. 
%>0   
Prices 
     px     pn      
   0.019  -0.019   
   0.014  -0.014   
   0.023   0.023   
     96%     4%     
                      
   0.443  -0.443   
  0.467  -0.467  
            0.286   0.286         
                96%      4%       
                     
        Land rent    
                DKK/hectare       
    Mean        39183.77    
  Median      39027.06     
       Std Dev.    11624.48       
         %>0           100%       
  
Prices 
     px     pn      
   0.020  -0.020   
   0.014  -0.014   
   0.025   0.025   
     97%     3%     
                      
   0.459  -0.459   
  0.464  -0.464  
            0.232   0.232         
                 97%    3%        
                    
        Land rent   
       DKK/hectare
 Mean        39324.94    
  Median      39290.13     
       Std Dev.    11109.20       
         %>0           100%       
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Derivation of the quota effect on marginal land rent
The general specification of marginal land rent under quotas from equation (15) is:
where the trans-log specification of  is
*BQi
*zi
'
BQi
zi
b z % c z,xln(p xi,t) % c
z,nln(p ni,t) % c
z,zln(zi,t)
straightforward. The trans-log specification of Qi (i.e. the fertilizer demand induced by the tax
adjusted price ) is  so that:(p ni %qi) Qi'
BQi s
n
i
(p ni %qi)
which, after inserting into (a.1), gives the following trans-log specification of marginal land rent:
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